physicists it appears that not only does foundational research not lead to genuine scientific progress, but that it is in fact dangerous, with the potential for getting people "down the drain." Even to the more tolerant ones it often seems that what is achieved merely supports what every good physicist should have known already.
While these perceptions are partly true, they are also in part misapprehensions arising from the, to our taste, much too practical approach taken by many physicists. Basic questions concerning the physical meaning of quantities, such as the wave function, which we manipulate in our computations are too important to be left to philosophers. One such question, whether the description of a physical system provided by its wave function is complete, is central to the articles reprinted in this section. [ We refer to papers in this book by [ :b] and to papers on the CD-ROM by [ :c] . ] Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) [[4] :b] argue that quantum mechanics provides at best an incomplete description of physical reality. Indeed, they claim that there are situations in which the very predictions of quantum theory demand that there be elements of physical reality-i.e., predetermined, preexisting values for physical quantities, which are revealed rather than created if and when we measure those quantities-that are not incorporated within the orthodox quantum framework. In the original version of the argument, these elements of reality are the (simultaneous) values of the position and momentum of a particle belonging to an EPR pair-a pair of particles whose quantum state, given by the EPR wave function, involves such strong quantum pair correlations that the position or momentum of one of the particles can be inferred from the measurement of that of the other. By the uncertainty principle, however, the position and momentum of one particle cannot simultaneously be part of the quantum description. In the later version of the EPR analysis due to Bohm [5] , which provides the framework for most of the experimental tests of quantum theory that were stimulated by the celebrated Bell's inequality paper [2] , these elements of reality are the values of the (simultaneous) components, in all possible directions, of the spins of the particles belonging to a Bohm-EPR pair-a pair of spin 1/2 particles prepared in the singlet S = 0 state-or, in another version, the simultaneous components of photon polarization in a suitable photon pair. We shall call these the Bohm-EPR elements of reality. (They again cannot simultaneously be part of the quantum description because spin components in different directions do not commute.)
The EPR analysis begins with a criterion of reality: "If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty ... the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity." EPR continue, "It seems to us that this criterion, while far from exhausting all possible ways of recognizing a physical reality, at least provides us with one such way .... Regarded not as a necessary, but merely as a sufficient, condition of reality, this criterion is in agreement with classical as well as quantummechanical ideas of reality." They then deduce the existence of the relevant elements of reality for an EPR pair from the predictions of quantum theory for the pair. In so doing, however, they crucially require a locality assumption, that "the process of measurement carried out on the first system ... does not disturb the second system in any way." EPR conclude as follows: "While we have thus shown that the wave function does not provide a complete description of the physical reality, we left open the question of whether or not such a description exists. We believe, however, that such a theory is possible."
We wish to emphasize that in arguing here for the incompleteness of the quantum description, EPR were not questioning the validity of the experimental predictions of quantum theory. On the contrary, they were claiming that these predictions were not only compatible with a more complete description-in particular, one involving their elements of reality-but also demanded one. Elsewhere, Einstein [6] asserts that in "a complete physical description, the statistical quantum theory would ... take an approximately analogous position to the statistical mechanics within the framework of classical mechanics." Niels Bohr [[7] :b], in what is perhaps the definitive statement of his principle of complementarity, disagreed with the EPR conclusion, though he did not take the EPR analysis lightly. The central objection in Bohr's reply is that the EPR reality criterion "contains an ambiguity as regards the meaning of the expression 'without in any way disturbing a system.' Of course, there is ... no question of a mechanical disturbance .... But ... there is essentially the question of an influence on the very conditions which ... constitute an inherent element of the description of any phenomenon to which the term 'physical reality' can be properly attached ...." While, with Bell [8] , we "have very little idea what this means," it does perhaps suggest "the feature of wholeness typical of proper quantum phenomena" elsewhere stressed by Bohr [9] .
Bohm [[10] :b], [ [11] :c], on the other hand, not only agreed with EPR that the quantum description is incomplete, but showed explicitly how to extend the incomplete quantum description-by the introduction of "hidden variables"-into a complete one, in such a way that the indeterminism of quantum theory is completely eliminated. We shall call Bohm's deterministic completion of nonrelativistic quantum theory Bohmian mechanics. In Bohmian mechanics the "hidden variables" are simply the positions of the particles, which move, under an evolution governed by the wave function, in what is in effect the simplest possible manner [12] . We should emphasize that Bohmian mechanics is indeed an extension of quantum theory, in the sense that in this theory, as in quantum theory, the wave function evolves autonomously according to Schrödinger's equation. Moreover, it can be shown [12] that the statistical description in quantum theory, given by ρ = |ψ| 2 , indeed takes, as Einstein wanted,
"an approximately analogous position to the statistical mechanics within the framework of classical mechanics." Bohmian mechanics was ignored by most physicists, but it was taken very seriously by Bell, who declared [13] that "in 1952 I saw the impossible done." Bell quite naturally asked how Bohm had managed to do what von Neumann [14] had proclaimed to be-and almost all authorities agreed was-impossible. (It is perhaps worth noting that despite the almost universal acceptance among physicists of the soundness of von Neumann's proof of the impossibility of hidden variables, undoubtedly based in part on von Neumann's well-deserved reputation as one of the greatest mathematicians of the twentieth century, Bell [15] felt that the assumptions made by von Neumann about the requirements for a hidden-variable theory are so unreasonable that "the proof of von Neumann is not merely false but foolish!" See also Ref. 16 .) His ensuing hidden-variables analysis led to Bell's inequality, which must be satisfied by certain correlations between Bohm-EPR elements of reality-and, of course, by correlations between their measured values. He observed also that quantum theory predicts a sharp violation of the inequality when the quantities in question are measured.
Thus the specific elements of reality to which the EPR analysis would lead (if applied to the Bohm-EPR version) must satisfy correlations that are incompatible with those given by quantum theory. That is, these elements of reality, whatever else they may be, are demonstrably incompatible with the predictions of quantum theory and hence are certainly not part of any completion of it. It follows that there is definitely something wrong with the EPR analysis, since quantum mechanics cannot be (even partially) completed in the manner demanded by this analysis. In other words, had EPR been aware of the work of Bell, they might well have predicted that quantum theory is wrong and proposed an experimental test of Bell's inequality to settle the issue once and for all.
Of course, EPR were not aware of Bell's analysis, but Clauser, Horne, Shimony, and Holt were [ [17] :c]. Their proposal for an experimental test has led to an enormous proliferation of experiments, the most conclusive of which was perhaps that of Aspect et al. [ [3] :b] included here. The result: Quantum mechanics is right.
We note, however, that the predictions of (nonrelativistic) quantum mechanics-in particular, those for the experimental tests of Bell's inequality-are in complete agreement with the predictions of Bohmian mechanics. Thus the Bohm-EPR elements of reality are not part of Bohmian mechanics! This is because in Bohmian mechanics the result of what we speak of as measuring a spin component depends as much upon the detailed experimental arrangement for performing the measurement as it does upon anything existing prior to and independent of the measurement. This dependence is an example of what the experts in the hidden-variables field call contextuality [18] , (see also Ref. 15) i.e., of the critical importance of not overlooking "the interaction with the measuring instruments which serve to define the conditions under which the phenomena appear" [19] .
In fact, just before he arrived at his inequality, Bell noticed that "in this [Bohm' s] theory an explicit causal mechanism exists whereby the disposition of one piece of apparatus affects the results obtained with a distant piece. ... Bohm of course was well aware of these features of his scheme, and has given them much attention. However, it must be stressed that, to the present writer's knowledge, there is no proof that any hidden variable account of quantum mechanics must have this extraordinary character. It would therefore be interesting, perhaps, to pursue some further 'impossibility proofs,' replacing the arbitrary axioms objected to above by some condition of locality, or of separability of distant systems" [18] . Almost immediately, Bell found his inequality. Thus did Bohmian mechanics lead to Bell's refutation of the EPR claim to have "shown that the wave function does not provide a complete description." At the same time it showed, by explicit example, the correctness of the EPR belief "that such a theory is possible"! While Bell's analysis, together with the results of experiments such as Aspect's, implies that the EPR analysis was faulty, where in fact did EPR go wrong? Since their only genuine assumption was that of locality quoted above, and since their subsequent reasoning is valid, it is this assumption that must fail, both for quantum theory and for nature herself. Aspect's experiment thus establishes perhaps the most striking implication of quantum theory: Nature is nonlocal! This conclusion is of course implicit in the very structure of quantum theory itself, based as it is on a field-the wave function-which for a many-body system lives not on physical space but on a 3n-dimensional configuration space, a structure that allows for the entanglement of states of distant systems-as most dramatically realized in the EPR state itself. But while quantum mechanics may someday be replaced by a theory of an entirely different character, we may nonetheless conclude-though there are some who disagree [15] from Bell and Aspect that the nonlocality it implies is here to stay.
One of the great foundational mysteries that remains very much unsolved is how nonlocality can be rendered compatible with special relativity, i.e., with Lorentz invariance. Here Bohmian mechanics is of no direct help, since it manifestly and fundamentally is not Lorentz invariant. But there is no reason to believe that a more appropriate completion of quantum theory, one that is Lorentz invariant and perhaps even generally covariant, cannot be found. However, one should not expect finding it to be easy.
One lesson of this story is perhaps that we would be wise to place greater trust in the mathematical structure of quantum theory, and less in the philosophy with which quantum theory is so often encumbered. For the EPR problem, the mathematical structure correctly suggests nonlocality, while the philosophy makes the questionable demand that the wave function pro-vide a complete description, at least on the microscopic level. The paper [ [20] :b] by Aharonov and Bohm included here supports this lesson. Aharonov and Bohm dramatically demonstrate that the electromagnetic vector potential has a reality in quantum theory far beyond what it has classically: a nonvanishing vector potential may generate a shift in an interference pattern for an electron confined to a region in which the magnetic field itself vanishes. The AharonovBohm effect, while rather clear from the role played by the vector potential in Schrödinger's equation, is rather surprising from the perspective of the usual quantum philosophy, which, in attempting to explain quantum deviations from classical behavior, appeals to limitations on what can be measured or known arising from disturbances occurring during the act of measurement that are due to the finiteness of the quantum of action.
It is appropriate to mention at this time-even though it is not the focus of any of the five papers included in this chapter-one of the strongest arguments for the conclusion that the quantum mechanical description is incomplete: the notorious measurement problem-or, what amounts to the same thing, the paradox of Schrödinger's cat. The problem is that the after-measurement wave function for system and apparatus arising from Schrödinger's equation for the composite system typically involves a superposition over terms corresponding to what we would like to regard as the various possible results of the measurement-e.g., different pointer orientations. Since it seems rather important that the actual result of the measurement be a part of the description of the after-measurement situation, it is difficult to see how this wave function could be the complete description of this situation. By contrast, with a theory or interpretation in which the description of the after-measurement situation includes, in addition to the wave function, at least the values of the variables that register the result, the measurement problem vanishes. (The remaining problem of then justifying the use of the "collapsed" wave function-corresponding to the actual result-in place of the original one is often confused with the measurement problem. The justification for this replacement is nowadays frequently expressed in terms of decoherence. One of the best descriptions of the mechanisms of decoherence, though not the word itself, can be found in the Bohm article reprinted here; see also Ref. 5 . We wish to emphasize, however, as did Bell in his article "Against Measurement" [21] , that decoherence per se in no way comes to grips with the measurement problem itself.)
The orthodox response to the measurement problem is that we must distinguish between closed systems and open systems-those upon which an external "observer" intervenes. While we do not want to delve into the merits of this response here-nor is this the place to discuss the sundry proposals for alternate interpretations of quantum theory, such as those of Schulman [22] and of Pearle [[23] :c], [24] and Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber [25] , [26] -we do wish to note one particular difficulty, much emphasized of late. This concerns the now-popular subject of quantum cosmology, concerned with the physics of the universe as a whole, certainly a closed system! A formulation of quantum mechanics that makes sense for closed systems seems to be demanded. Bohmian mechanics is one such formulation. Others also now generating a good deal of excitement are due to Griffiths [27] , Omnès [28] , and Gell-Mann and Hartle [29] . All of these exemplify the EPR conclusion "that the wave function does not provide a complete description of the physical reality."
